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Abstract
This paper looks at public sector debt in developing countries, being concerned
specifically with the relationship between aid inflows and the public sector borrowing
requirement net of aid loans. After examining the public sector budget constraint and
various conditions under which aid might lead to an increase in this borrowing, the
paper surveys the empirical results of literature on aid and public sector fiscal
behaviour. It finds that the results of a number of studies are consistent with aid leading
to increases in this borrowing. Further investigation, in the form of econometric analysis
of panel data, also points to this outcome. The paper then looks at a number of
theoretical scenarios in which aid leads to increases in borrowing net of aid loans.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on public sector fiscal aspects of foreign development aid.
Most interest is on the impact of aid on various categories of public sector revenue and
expenditure. Some studies are concerned primarily with the question of whether aid is
used for expenditure purposes other than those for which donors intended (see for
example, Pack and Pack 1990, 1993; World Bank 1998; Feyzioglu et al. 1998). Put
more succinctly, these studies are concerned with the fungibility problem of aid. Other
studies provide a more comprehensive analysis of the public sector fiscal response to
aid, by simultaneously analysing interactions between aid, taxation and expenditure
decisions. Borrowing, net of aid, as a component of the public sector budget constraint,
is incorporated into these analyses but gets relatively little attention. It is often merely
treated as a residual variable, and is assumed to be a substitute for aid, especially aid
loans: as aid loans increase, recipient governments depend less on this form of finance.
The implicit policy prescription resulting from this assumption is clear: give more aid,
in particular loans, if we want recipient governments to depend less on this form of
(additional) borrowing and to prevent them acquiring more debt.
This paper takes a closer look at the link between aid and additional borrowing. This
form of borrowing is often financing of last resort, as it is intended to finance an
unanticipated gap between expenditure and revenue and other forms of financing. As
such the terms and conditions to which it can be subject are relatively disadvantageous
to the recipient. While this paper does not look at the consequences of this form of
borrowing, it does question both the assumption that it is a substitute for aid and the
resultant policy prescription. It starts by looking at the public sector budget constraint
and various conditions under which aid might actually lead to an increase in this
borrowing. It proceeds by surveying the empirical results of literature on aid and public
sector fiscal behaviour. It finds that the results of a number of studies are consistent with
aid leading to increases in this borrowing. Further investigation, in the form of
econometric analysis of panel data, also points to this outcome. The paper then looks at
a number of theoretical scenarios in which aid leads to increases in borrowing net of aid
loans. Most of these scenarios depict aid and overspending resulting from
misperceptions or illusions relating to either the real or nominal value of the aid inflow.
2 Aid and public sector debt
Central to the literature on fiscal response and fungibility is the public sector budgetary
constraint. This constraint can be written as follows
B + A + R = E l k j i (1)
where Ei is a vector of i government expenditure variables, Rj is a vector of j domestic
recurrent revenue variables, Ak is a vector of k aid variables (including grants and loans)
and Bl is a vector of l borrowing variables net of aid loans (additional borrowing).


























Our interest is in ¶ Bl/¶ Ak - incremental aid-induced borrowing. Borrowing occurs









Aid-induced borrowing emerges in a number of scenarios. We highlight five. The first
is where both expenditure and recurrent revenues increase in response to aid, but where
the former increases by more than the value of the latter plus aid. The formal conditions
under which this specific scenario emerges are as follows:













The second scenario is where expenditure increases by more than the value of the aid














The third is where expenditures rise and recurrent revenues fall; that is:














The fourth is where expenditures remain unchanged but recurrent revenues fall by more
than the value of the aid inflow; that is:














The fifth is where both expenditures and recurrent revenues fall, but with the latter

















Few studies provide estimates of ¶ Bl/¶ Ak as they either do not report or estimate a
borrowing equation (it is the omitted equation in the systems estimation in many of the
fiscal response studies). It can however be reasonably easily derived from those results





















and that estimates of ¶ Ei/¶ Ak and ¶ Bl/¶ Ak are reported in most studies.
Estimates of ¶ Bl/¶ Ak, derived in this manner, are reported in Table 1.1 Eight of the 16
borrowing parameters shown in this table are positive. These positive values range
between 0.11 and (a perhaps implausibly large) 9.50, in the cases of the Pack and Pack
(1993) study of the Dominican Republic and the cross-country study of Cashel-Cordo
and Craig (1990). Of the scenarios identified above, three fall into scenario one, four
into scenario three and one falls into scenario five.
3.2 Additional evidence
The majority of studies looking at aid and public sector fiscal behaviour, and arguably
the most insightful, are those which have been labelled as the ‘fiscal response’ variety.
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a) provide a review of these and related studies.2
These studies, following Heller (1975) posit a utility maximizing problem in which
public sector fiscal decisionmakers are assumed to minimize a loss function subject to
constraints similar to those shown above in equation (1). The losses are minimized (and
utility maximized) by ensuring that gaps between target and actual levels of expenditure
and revenue are as small as possible. Structural equations and reduced-form equations
are derived from this problem and subsequently estimated using observable data.
The fiscal response literature has undergone significant development since the original
study of Heller (1975). The current state of the art treats aid flows as endogenous, and
as such subject to the loss-minimization process, and assumes ex ante that the non-aid
borrowing target is zero. The reduced-form borrowing equation consistent with this
approach may be written as follows:












* are targets for public sector investment, expenditure, recurrent
expenditure, taxation and other recurrent revenue, and aid (both grants and loans)
respectively. ￿0 and ￿ are constant and error terms. I*g, G
* and R
* are estimated,
following the approach used in the fiscal response literature and A
* is committed aid
(disbursed aid is the endogenous variable in the relevant literature).3 The key parameter,
for the purposes of this study, is ￿4.4
Although aid disbursements are treated as endogenous, aid commitments are treated as
exogenous. This is central to our analysis and has been discussed extensively, with
support, in the aid allocation and fiscal response literatures (see, for example, Franco-
Rodriguez et al. 1998). This treatment’s justification is that the amount of aid
committed is commonly determined in the previous year, or years, and therefore cannot
be influenced by borrowing in the current year. Current disbursements might be
adjusted on the basis of aid decisionmakers becoming aware of non-aid borrowing, but
not commitments, which are predetermined.
Table 1
Constraint equation parameters
Study ¶ Ei/¶ Ak ¶ Rj/¶ Ak ¶ Bl/¶ AK









Pack and Pack (1990) - Indonesia, 1966-86 1.58 0.29 0.29
Cashel-Cordo and Graig (1990), 46 countries, 1975-80 8.66 -1.84 9.50
Gang and Khan (1991) - India, 1961-89
Aid disaggregated into grants and loans







Pillai (1982) - Jordan, 1960-78 0.65 -0.5 0.15
Chisti and Hasan (1992) - Pakistan, 1976-88 3.01 0.69 1.32
Khan and Hoshino (1992) - Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Sri Lanka, 1955-76. 0.96 0.21 -0.25
Pack and Pack (1993) - Dominican Republic, 1968-86 0.72 -0.39 0.11
Gupta (1993) - India, 1969-93 1.97 0.01 0.96
Iqbal (1997) - Pakistan, 1976-95 1.00 0.10 -0.10
Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) - Pakistan, 1960-95 -2.30 -3.60 0.30
McGillivray and Ahmed (1999) - The Philippines, 1960-92 -1.90 -0.10 -2.80
Swaroop et al. (2000) - India, 1970-95 0.54 -0.31 -0.15
Franco-Rodriguez (2000) - Costa Rica 0.50 0.05 -0.55
Data required to estimate (4) were obtained from the OECD’s International
Development Statistics (2001) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(2000). A panel dataset is constructed for the period 1980 to 1997. The panel consists of
634 observations for 79 developing countries. Panel datasets allow for empirical
analysis which accounts for unobserved country-specific effects. It is possible to treat
the country-specific effects as either fixed or random. The fixed effects approach
involves splitting the constant into a different part for each individual country in the
sample, and estimating the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Essentially, this
involves estimating the model with a dummy variable for each developing country.
Estimates of (4) obtained using the fixed effects approach are as follows.4
m + + + + - + - =
* # * # * # * # # 65 . 1 09 . 0 21 . 0 20 . 2 11 88 . 6 A T G I e B g




# denotes significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level or greater.
Pertinently, the estimate of ￿4 is positive and significant, indicating that a one unit
change in aid commitments results in a 1.65 unit change in non-aid borrowing. The
resultant conclusion, that aid is positively associated with non-aid borrowing, is robust
with respect to alternative estimates of the targets for investment, expenditure, recurrent
revenue, and measures of the aid variable (specifically, in which aid disbursements are
used instead of commitments). In each case ￿4 remained positive and significantly
different from zero, with its values ranging from 1.99 to 0.85.
4 Towards an explanation5
How might the above results, pointing to aid-induced additional borrowing, be
explained? In this section we offer a tentative explanation, tentative in the sense that we
provide a number of theoretical scenarios which require subsequent investigation. Our
concern is with the behaviour of a particular spending unit within the public sector of a
given developing country, what we have termed implementing officials. We focus on
the actions of the implementing official with ultimate responsibility for specific
expenditure categories. The most important features distinguishing this unit are that: (i)
it is responsible for allocating a given amount of aid across various spending categories;
and (ii) that the total revenue pool it has at its disposal for allocation, including aid, is
exogenous to the preferences of the implementing officials. The second of these
assumptions is consistent with a situation in which a finance ministry controls revenue
flows, allocating given amounts of revenue, including aid, to spending or implementing
units. Thus, the finance ministry, or policy officials, draw up the budget and set
expenditure plans. Aid is assumed to be fully fungible to the policy official; that is, the
policy official treats aid like any other category of revenue and can allocate it according
to their own preferences, rather than those of the donor, which may be different.
We assume that the implementing unit derives utility purely from the quantities of
goods purchased with the revenue at its disposal. For convenience, and in a manner
similar to Feyzioglu et al. (1998), we divide goods into two categories: those that
donors intend the official to purchase with a given aid inflow (X) and all other publicly-
provided goods (Y). The aid inflow is again denoted as A, and comprises grants and
loans from official international donor agencies.6 The implementing official’s utility
function can be written as:
U=U ( X ,Y ) . (11)
The budget constraint faced by this official prior to receiving aid (via the policy official)
is
pxX+p yY=R (12)
where px and py are the prices of X and Y, respectively, and R is tax and other recurrent
revenue made available to the official for expenditure on X and Y. The optimizing
problem for the official is to maximize (11) subject to (12). Assuming homothetic
preferences, the solution is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 at point Z
I (I denoting
initial). We assume that this solution is what the policy official wants. This would be6
consistent with both sets of officials sharing the same preference map for X and Y,o r
that the policy official is able to dictate the implementing official’s marginal rate of
substitution between these two goods.
Assume that a donor provides aid and wants to see the inflow allocated entirely to
expenditure on X.U s i n gpxX
D as notation for the donor’s desired spending on X we have
pxX
D = pxX + A. It follows that X
D is the quantity of X that the donor wants purchased.
Assume also that prices remain constant and the aid is a cash block grant (it could
alternatively be aid in kind, a matching grant, a tied grant or even a loan). The new
budget constraint becomes:
pxX+p yY=R+A (13)
The new optimizing solution is Z* , which is used throughout to also represent the target
of policy officials. As will become clearer later, this would be the optimum of the
implementing official in the absence of illusion or misperception. Contrary to donor
intentions, expenditure on X does not increase by the value of the aid inflow (i.e. there is
fungibility). In this simple case, total expenditure on X and Y increases by the value of
the inflow.
Figure 1
Under what circumstances might total expenditure increase by an amount greater than
the value of the aid inflow? A possible and quite straightforward means is that the
finance ministry increases total tax and other recurrent revenue and makes this
increment to the (implementing) official responsible for spending, topping-up the aid




/ is the additional recurrent revenue. This could be depicted by a further
rightward shift in the budget line, with the new optimum yielding an overall increase in
expenditure that is greater than the value of the aid inflow. But recall that available
evidence often indicates that aid results in decreases in aggregate recurrent revenue.
While this does not necessary imply that reductions in such revenue are spread across
all public sector spending units, it would seem quite unlikely that, against this
background, the unit in question receives a net increase in revenue. Thus it would be
unreasonable to expect that the budget line would lie to the right of dc in Figure 1.
Another possibility is that tax revenue is diverted from another spending area, but this
too is inconsistent with the findings of the literature as it would imply a reduction in
expenditure elsewhere.
Let us now consider some other, more feasible and otherwise unexplored scenarios. In
each of these scenarios, expenditure increases in excess of aid are financed, eventually,
by additional borrowing. As asserted above, this borrowing is typically considered
financing of the last resort, as it is intended to finance an unanticipated gap between
expenditure and revenue. Such borrowing should not be modelled as a conscious and
deliberate supplement to aid inflows, and thus not as a simple and direct outward shift in
the budget line. Moreover, we assume that the borrowing implication is realized in the
period following this static optimiation and is not taken into account (agents are not
forward-looking).
Prior to turning to these scenarios it should be emphasized that in all scenarios
expenditure increases in excess of the aid inflows can still occur even with simultaneous
reductions in tax and other recurrent revenue (as in a number of the scenarios identified
above in section 2). This is not demonstrated explicitly as it should be reasonably clear
from the diagrams presented below. We do not seek to explain why tax revenues might
fall, but our analysis is not compromised if they do.
The first scenario is one in which the donor provides aid in kind, rather than as a cash
grant, as is sometimes the case in practice. Specifically, the donor seeks to increase the





A is the aid in kind and A = pxX
A and thus represents the recipient’s financial
valuation of the aid. Note that X+X
A must be equal to or greater than X
A, and thus the
budget line now contains a horizontal segment. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with the
corresponding budget line being cde.8
Figure 2
Aid may induce a perceived fall in domestic prices. The provision of aid in kind may
reduce the relative price of X. This could occur when recipient governments or their
agencies sell aid-financed commodities or services, or those provided in kind by donors,
at less than market prices. Alternatively, if there is a domestic private market that is
quantity constrained, there is an incentive for officials to divert aid goods to that market
(e.g. medicines). More generally, it could occur when aid results in an increase in
domestic supply, forcing down market prices. This does not apply to aid provided in
kind if X is not exchanged in domestic markets. Even if the aid does not affect domestic
prices, it is possible that the implementing official wrongly perceives that the domestic







/ is the perceived price of X,a n dA
/ = pcX
A. The corresponding budget line, in
Figure 2, is fgh. With homothetic preferences this results in an increase in expenditure
on X and Y, which exceeds the actual value of the aid inflow. In Figure 2 this is shown
by the move from point Z
I to Z
O (denoting outcome). Had the implementing official’s
perception of prices been correct, the corresponding move would have been from Z to
Z* (the policy official’s target). Note that Z* is the result of fungibility; the policy
officials had not planned to increase expenditure on X to the level desired by donors
(X
D) but rather to the lower level X* and releasing fungible funds to increase
expenditure on Y to Y*. However, as a result of misperceptions by the implementing
officials, the outcome Z
O results in the donor’s target X
D being met (although this may
not necessarily be the outcome). In this scenario, aid illusion results in aggregate
spending increasing by more than aid, and by more than policy officials planned, and9
spending on X may increase by the value of aid. Thus, the actions of implementing
officials can have the effect of countering the fungibility-driven intentions of policy
officials.
Given that the misperception results in a level of expenditure which cannot be supported
from the current budget, this would require an appeal for additional finance, most
probably by going back to the finance ministry which would then in turn need to borrow
from domestic or other sources.7 If borrowing is not permitted, the result may be a
termination of the budget such that some end-of-period expenditure is not met. Whether
this has the effect of meeting intended donor allocation ex post depends on the timing of
expenditure on X and Y.I f ,f o re x a m p l e ,a l lY had been provided then any shortfall
would impact on X. While these outcomes are not consistent with the empirical
evidence mentioned in the preceding section, donors could then either accept ex post
under-spending on X,o rr e l e a s en e wa i df o rX. In practice, borrowing often occurs; cash
budgets have had only a limited impact in constraining this (Stasavage and Moyo 2000).
A second scenario is one in which the recipient is allocated a matching grant, equal to
m, which subsidizes the purchase of X up to a threshold quantity X
#. The budget
constraint therefore becomes:
(1- m)pxX+p yY=R for X £ X
# (17)
The value of the aid inflow in this case equals mpxX and
i ss e ta tam a x i m u mo fmpxX
#. The corresponding budget line is acd in Figure 3.
The optimum point is now Z* which coincides with c, the corresponding quantity X*
coincides with X
# and expenditure increases by the full amount of the aid allocation
Figure 310
(and by the total amount of aid the donor was willing to provide). In this case, the
matching grant has the intended effect of ‘forcing’ policy officials to plan for Z* and X*
where there is no fungibility. Expenditure on Y does increase, to Y*; this is not due to
fungibility but instead an income effect resulting from the subsidy, with part of the
increase in real income (or saving resulting from the subsidy) being allocated to Y.
Budgetary processes can in all countries be chaotic to varying degrees, especially in
developing countries. One reason for this is information deficiency. It is quite possible
that the threshold is not adequately communicated to, or perceived by, the implementing
official. The budget constraint can thus be written as:
(1- m)pxX+p yY=R for X £ (1+b) X
# (18)
where b is an error parameter which for the purpose of our analysis is assumed to be
greater then zero. Under this scenario the implementing official behaves as if the
amount of aid available is Aa = mpx(1+ b) X
#. The corresponding budget line, with the
dotted segment in Figure 3, is aef.T h eo u t c o m e ,a sd r a w n ,i sZ
O, with expenditure
increasing by more than both the value of the aid inflow and the maximum amount the
donor is willing to provide. But at this point the official is overspending, in that Z
O lies
to the right of the actual budget line acd, and will have to obtain additional finance.
Thus, aid illusion here results in aggregate expenditure increasing by more than the
value of the aid and expenditure on X increases by more than even donors intended.
Additional financing will be required to fund the resulting deficit, and again empirical
findings suggest that this is not in the form of aid.
Figure 411
A third scenario also relates to a misperception, with the official thinking and acting as
if the aid inflow is not a matching grant but a block grant (perhaps the nature of the
grant was not fully communicated to the official). This is depicted in Figure 4. The
actual budget constraint after the provision of aid is (13), but the perceived constraint is
(9). The corresponding budget lines are acd and ed, respectively. The policy officials
plan Z*, corresponding to c and with no intended fungibility, but misperceptions by
implementing officials yield an outcome of Z
O. Total expenditure increases by an
amount greater than the aid inflow but the excess is allocated to Y rather than X,a n dt h e
government must obtain additional funds to finance this spending. In this case, although
policy officials did not take advantage of fungibility, aid illusion on the part of
implementing officials resulted in an outcome with the appearance of fungibility.
Aid often subsidizes the provision of public goods. Donors, from time to time, require
the recipient to recover provision costs by introducing or increasing charges for the
good under consideration (this is often the case for education or health care). Rationales
for this include the ability this affords to provide more goods or use the recovered funds
to improve public sector saving. Let us assume that the donor requires some cost
recovery and that the aid allocation under consideration is a block grant and that the
recovered costs are used to supply more of the good under consideration. This leads to
our fourth scenario. The budget constraint with cost recovery becomes
(px-cx)X + pyY=R+A (19)
where cx is the extent of cost recovery required by the donor, per unit of X sold to the
public. But it is quite common for recipient countries to fail in achieving the extent of
cost recovery required by donors. The budget constraint in this situation can be written
as
(px-[1-d]cx)X + pyY = T+A a and 0 £ d<1 (20)
where d represents the extent of cost recovery failure. Let us assume in this instance that
the policy official correctly perceives the extent of failure, which in this case is the
extreme with d=1; that is, there is no recovery at all. In this case the budget constraint
reduces to (9) and the budget line shifts to ce and the target becomes Z*. However, the
implementing official perceives incorrectly that there is full cost recovery and therefore
no failure (d=0) and spends according to cd. The outcome is therefore Z
O, with
expenditure increasing by more than the value of the aid inflow and with additional
financing being required. More generally, this represents the problems inherent in
raising tax revenue (or achieving a specified revenue target) in developing countries.
This is a common cause of budget deficits, hence of borrowing.
Our final theoretical scenario is relatively straightforward: a cash block grant which
leads to an un- or not fully-anticipated increase in prices. This scenario relates to the
‘Dutch Disease’ effects of foreign aid. An increasing number of empirical studies have
found that large foreign aid inflows lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. The real
exchange rate is commonly defined as the relative price of traded goods (imports and
exports) to non-traded goods. Governments are usually the recipients of foreign aid and
the output of a public sector is primarily non-tradable in nature. Large inflows of foreign12
Figure 5
aid commonly lead to greater expenditures on non-tradeable goods. This increases the
demand for these goods and therefore leads to an increase in their price. Here we
assume, for simplicity, that the prices of both X and Y increase (although the price of
just one good increasing leads to the same outcome) and that this is fully un-anticipated.




The new optimizing solution is Z*. However the perceived budget constraint is (13) and
thus there is overspending which must be financed. This scenario is depicted in
Figure 6.
The various scenarios outlined here all indicate how aid can induce overspending by
recipients (albeit not necessarily on the goods donors may wish to see increased
spending), which results in borrowing in addition to aid loans already received. The
problem arises because the spending official may not correctly perceive the budget
constraint, what we refer to in general as aid illusion. Such misperceptions may arise
because the nature of restrictions on the aid grant are not communicated properly, or
because the aid is linked to ambitious cost recovery (or revenue raising) targets. Donors
adopt various means to reduce fungibility, such as matching grants or aid in kind, but
we have shown that these may not be effective. Such measures may neither ensure the
aid is allocated to the intended items nor that aid does not induce overspending. The
implication is not to reduce aid, nor even to attach more conditions to aid. Rather,
donors need to ensure that aid is granted in a transparent simple way, and technical
assistance is provided for budgetary planning in recipient countries.13
Figure 6
5 Conclusion
This paper challenged the assumption that aid and borrowing (net of aid loans) are
substitutes. Instead, it showed that based on some previous studies and new panel data
estimates that aid can actually be positively associated with this form of borrowing and
therefore lead to increases in debt. The paper then considered a number of theoretical
scenarios in which most of the spending decisions of recipient governments are subject
to illusions or misperceptions regarding either the nominal or real value of aid. In each
case the overspending is the result, which in turn leads to additional, non-aid borrowing.
Finally, it ought to be emphasized that this paper is far from a definitive treatment of aid
and public sector borrowing. Its main objective was to give attention to a largely
overlooked issue in the literature of foreign aid, in the hope that is receives far more
attention. Possible directions for future research are to look into the composition of this
form of borrowing more comprehensive econometric investigation of its determinants.
Notes
1 All estimates shown in Table 1, with the exception of those of Pillai (1982) are point. Very similar
conclusions are drawn from non-point estimates (that is, where statistically insignificant values are set14
to zero). The estimates of a number of studies listed in Table 1, which do report results for additional
borrowing, do not satisfy equation (2). In this event ¶ Bl/¶ AK was re-estimated using equation (9).
2 Note that McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a) are rather critical of the approaches used in the
literature, including those of studies for which results are reported in Table 1. The usual degree of
caution should be attached to interpretations drawn from this table, therefore.
3 Further details of target estimation are available from the authors.
4 The model was also estimated using the random effects approach. However, the approach implied that
individual country effects were unimportant and the results reduced to those of OLS estimation. The
fixed effects approach found that country-specific effects are important, which is very likely to be the
actual case.
5 This section draw heavily on McGillivray and Morrissey (2001b).
6 Loans for the purpose of our analysis would be measured in net terms; that is, the amount of the loan
disbursed, less repayments, in the current period.
7 Further to the above discussion of actual price changes, it is possible that the price of X could actually
rise as a result of the aid in kind, owing to an increase in demand shown in Figure 2. If not perceived
this would exacerbate the outcome just illustrated. Aid-induced price rises are discussed below.15
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